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CHAPTER NINE
The Evolution of Strategic and Coordinated
Bargaining Campaigns in the 1990s
The Steelworkers' Experience
Kate Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich
W ith the refocusing of attention of the labor movement on orga-nizing, an increasing number of scholars have been directing
their research toward the nature and practice of current union orga-
nizing efforts (Bronfenbrenner, et aL 1998; LaborStudiesJournaII999).
These scholars have begun updating a literature that had grown sorely
out of touch with the organizing experience of America's unions and
have provided the foundation for a more sophisticated understanding
of the organizing process.
While we applaud this resurgence in organizing research, there has
not been a comparable resurgence in research on collective bargaining.
Yet the tremendous growth of contract campaigns, or what alterna-
tively have been called coordinated or strategic campaigns, has been
no less significant than the revolution in union organizing. Beginning
with the early efforts of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers
(OCAW) at BASF and of the United Mineworkers at Pittston Coal to
more recent campaigns such as the Teamsters at United Parcel Service
and the Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE) at the Frontier
Hotel, the labor movement has used these campaigns with increasing
. SUccess.Although organizing is important for the revival of American
labor, strategic and coordinated contract campaigns are equally essen-
tial to labor's effort to rebuild and revitalize the movement. Without
these campaigns, unions will continue to lose as many new workers as
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they gain, and newly organized workers will never be able to achieve
contractual guarantees for the rights and protections for which they
risked so much in the organizing process.
Collective bargaining and contract campaigns matter because they
are the focal point for the power and voice that workers can achieve
only through unionization. Collective-bargaining campaigns are also
the forum in which unions and union members most connect with
customers, dients, and the broader public. When successful, these cam-
paigns result in a significant expansion of union organizing opportuni-
ties, bargaining leverage, political dout, and a concomitant shift of pub-
lic support toward unions. When they fail, as the labor movement
learned so painfully with the Professional Association of Air Traffic Con-
trollers (PATCO), they undermine labor's efforts for years to come.
Much of the recent collective-bargaining research, however, still
dings to an older industrial relations model that focuses either on large
industry analyses (Voos 1994), economic cost benefit analysis (Kauf-
man 1992; Card 1990), behavioral models of bargaining (Walton and
McKersie 1991; Wheeler 1985), or strategic-choice models (Kochan,
Katz, McKersie 1994; Walton, CUtcher-Gershenfeld, McKersie 1994).
There has been an increase in union training materials on contract and
strategic campaigns (AFA 1997; AFL-CIO 1985b; SEIU 1988; Rogers
1994) as well as a smaller literature critical of the use of these campaigns
by the labor movement (Northrup 1996; DiLorenzo 1996). However,
aside from Getman's work on the United Paperworkers International
Union (UPIU) strike at International Paper (1998), Rosenblum's book
on Phelps Dodge (1995), and our book on the Steelworkers' campaign
at Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation (Juravich and Bronfenbren-
ner 1999), there have been few detailed analytic studies of corporate
and strategic campaigns.
In this chapter we trace the evolution of the use of strategic cam-
paigns by the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) over several
decades. This research is based on a series of in-depth analyses of six
coordinated Steelworker campaigns that occurred between 1985 and
1997. The research began with a major study of the Ravenswood cam-
paign (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999), followed by subsequent
studies conducted with our students on campaigns at USX (formerly
US Steel) (Batchelor and Clark 1998), the Northern Indiana Public Ser-
vice Company (Clark and Hammer 1998
Wheeling Pitt (O'Malley 1998), and Brid
al. 2000). For the Bridgestone/Firestone
study conducted by Nancy Lessin (1998).
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evaluation of campaign documents.
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Wheeling Pitt (O'Malley 1998), and Bridgestone/Firestone (Balfour et
al. 2000). For the Bridgestone/Firestone campaign we also relied on a
study conducted by Nancy Lessin (1998). The research for all six cam-
paigns is based on interviews with major participants and a review and
evaluation of campaign documents.
Phelps Dodge: The World Turned Upside Down
Throughout the 1950S, 1960s, and 1970s, the USWA, like most other
industrial unions, developed a system of industry-wide pattern bar-
gaining. This allowed them to negotiate with a number of employers
simultaneously, using their combined power and leverage to standard-
ize terms and conditions of employment to the highest common de-
nominator. By the 1980s, however, this system of pattern bargaining
was under attack.
Early in 1983, the Nonferrous Industry Conference, led by USWA
Secretary- Treasurer Frank McKee, met to begin to prepare for a new
round of bargaining in the copper industry. From the beginning the
union position was clear. Despite the wave of concessions that had
plagued the steel industry, the Steelworkers would hold the line in cop-
per. On June 3°, 1983, after months of stalled negotiations with in-
dustry leader Phelps Dodge, the Steelworkers had had enough. Frank
McKee gathered the USWA team together:
e evolUtion of the use of strategic cam-
)rkers of America (USWA) over several
d on a series of in-depth analyses of six
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'Alex [Lopez, chief negotiator for the local union], tell your people
we're not getting anywhere,' said McKee. 'PD wants to try and
bust us. Can you get your troops together?' Lopez looked over at
[Angel] Rodriguez [local union president]. Of course they could
get the troops together. Of course they could whip Phelps Dodge
(Rosenblum 1995, 80).
Within a month's time, however, it was apparent that this was not
going to be just another strike in which labor and management would
engage in a ritual form of warfare. It would be an all-oUt war. Phelps
Dodge was undergoing a massive corporate restructuring under Pres-
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ident Richard Moolick and was struggling to find a new bottom line.
The company had anticipated the strike and, relying on the manual
Operating During Strikes developed by former GE executive and now
Wharton School of Business professor Herbert Northrup, they had no
intention of continuing pattern bargaining or conceding to the Steel-
workers' demands.
Over the next several months Phelps Dodge brought in replacement
workers and armed security guards and, when the workers and their
union fought back, convinced the governor to bring in the National
Guard. Unprepared for this level of warfare and with little experience
with these tactics, the Steelworkers all but lost once the National Guard
was brought in. Although the largely Mexican-American workforce
fought bravely, by March 1986 the union was decertified. As Jonathan
Rosenblum argues in his book, Copper Crucible (1995), this strike in a
small New Mexico town, even more than the defeat at PATCO, was
the struggle in which American corporations pioneered the aggressive
anti-union strategy that would become a blueprint for breaking strikes
and breaking unions in the decades that followed.
USX: The Steelworkers Fight Back
The loss to Phelps Dodge was devastating to the Steelworkers, who in
many ways were already in free fall. Employment in steel had plum-
meted from more than 45°,000 jobs in 1979 to 15°,000 by 1987. The
combination of foreign competition, badly outdated plants and equip-
ment, unfavorable trade policies, and the resulting glut in the supply
of steel left the industry paralyzed. Mirroring the industry, member-
ship in the USWA dropped from 1.4 million in 1980 to just 680,000
by 1986 (Hoerr 1988).
Just as in copper, after thirty years of pattern bargaining the union
would have to bargain individually with basic steel companies like
USX.l They would also face an entirely different corporate structure
IAII information on USX is drawn from Batchelor and Clark (1998) unless otherwise
noted.
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and model. As Batchelor and Clark explain, "Although US Steel was
still the largest steel producer in the country, it found itself at the mercy
of Wall Street, and scrambled to fend off several takeover attempts amid
continued operating deficits and an increasing debt load" (Batchelor
and Clark 1998, IO-n).
US Steel responded to this turbulence by diversifYing, moving into
the oil and gas industry through the purchase of both Marathon Oil
and Texas Oil and Gas. By the summer of 1986, Chairman David Rod-
erick announced a massive restructuring of the company, including a
name change to USx. US Steel would now constitUte only one of its
four divisions.
Central to the union's bargaining strategy was an effort to force steel
companies to open their books for union inspection. As USWA chief
negotiator Bernie Kleiman recalls, "We had actUally looked to a very
significant degree into the inside workings for the first time of LTV,
Bethlehem, National, Inland, and Armco. . . we were much more in
the dark at US Steel and mostly US Steel just kind oflaid in the bushes
. . . " (Batchelor and Clark 1998,27-28).
But the company held firm, refusing to disclose any financial in-
formation and adamantly insisting on outsourcing union work. In the
middle of July the Steelworkers told the press, ''The company has pUt
on the table contract changes that would turn back the clock on work-
ers' rights more than fifty years" (Batchelor and Clark 1998, 33). In a
last ditch effort, thirteen hoUts before the contract was set to expire,
the union offered to work under the terms of the old agreement, but
the company locked them out.
During the first few months of the lockout, the company and the
union conducted a public relations war as both sides tried to portray
the other as the primary instigator of the conflict. Workers applied for
unemployment compensation, which was handled differently by each
state in which the 22,000 workers lived.
Even though the company had successfully stockpiled tons of steel,
. the main strategy of the USWA was to keep USX from shipping metal.
Based on an agreement between the company and the union at the Lo-
rain, Ohio, plant, no metal was shipped during the first two months
of the lockoUt. In a good faith move, the USWA even agreed to help
ship some metal that had been ordered before the lockout.
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But by the end of November, the deal was off USX decided to ship
steel. More than six hundred union members assembled at the plant
gate to block the first shipment. Late in the afternoon, just as union
officials believed that the company had changed its mind, the trains.
began to move. The shipment was escorted by more than 17° police
in full riot gear who attacked the locked-out workers. USWA District
Director Frank Valenta had his nose broken and sustained a shoulder
ill)ury.
The local in Gary, Indiana, was no less militant. Early in Septem-
ber more than two hundred locked-out Steelworkers blockaded the
main gate. Although forty-three were arrested, they were undaunted.
They held their line, intimidating truck drivers willing to cross. As
Christmas approached, the picket lines swelled.
This local pressure forced USX back to the bargaining table. An
agreement was reached with the assistance of steel mediator Sylvester
Garret. Although the union agreed to concessions, they were consid-
erably fewer than those the company originally proposed, and the
union won significant protections against contracting out, one of the
primary issues in the campaign.
While the battle at USX did not represent a full-fledged strategic
campaign, it was important for two reasons. For the first time the
USWA saw the bargaining process as an information-gathering process
to learn as much as possible about the internal workings of an indi-
vidual corporation. Particularly in the face of an industry teeming with
corporate mergers, takeovers, and reorganizations, it was no longer
enough for the union to examine only its own strength as they had
done, rather cavalierly, at Phelps Dodge. To move beyond concession-
ary bargaining, they would need to develop the expertise to identifY
which employers were truly in trouble and which companies were using
economic conditions as a smoke screen for concession bargaining and
union busting.
Second, the USX campaign also marked the first time in several
decades that the Steelworkers moved outside the traditional legal re-
sponses to strikes and lockouts. Although direct action such as at USX
was parr and parcel of the Steelworkers' union in the 1930S and 1940s,
it had all but disappeared as the union came to rely on the legal pro-
tections and the social compact between labor and management that
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alone would not always prove to be sufficient, USX marked a para-
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When the Ravenswood Aluminum Company (RAe) locked out its
more than seventeen hundred workers on October 31,199°, it looked
ominous for the Steelworkers.2 Following the model pioneered at
Phelps Dodge, Ravenswood management operated the plant from the
first day of the lockout, literally bringing replacement workers in one
door as their unionized workforce was leaving the plant by another.
The woods surrounding the plant had been cleared, windows were
boarded up, and the plant was heavily fortified by a chain link fence
and an armed security force. The workers dubbed the plant "Fort
RAC"
Over the next three months the Ravenswood lockout began to look
more like another long drawn-out defeat for labor. For the USWA,
who had watched their influence in the copper industry plummet with
the loss at Phelps Dodge, it looked like aluminum might be next. Pres-
ident George Becker (then vice president) described his first visit to the
plant three months into the lockout,
n also marked the first time in several
moved outside the traditional legal re-
.Although direct action such as at USX
lworkers' union in the 1930S and 1940s,
1e union came to rely on the legal pro-
:t between labor and management that
I found that our people were sitting on a picket line with no effec-
tive means of putting the company under pressure whatsoever.
Our members couldn't even picket in front of the plant. They
were under an injunction. They could stand at the side of the road
a mile from the gate and that was it. And I found at the time we
had about eleven hundred scabs in the plant already. No way to
slow them down. No way to stop them. No way to put pressure
on them. I found that we had a lot of people fired and people
2All information on Ravenswood is drawn ftOm Juravich and BtOnfenbrenner (1999) un-
less otherwise noted.
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were generally afraid to do anything and were not doing anything.
Simply said, nothing was being done that would be effective in
pressuring the company to return to the bargaining table (Juravich
and Bronfenbrenner 1999, 68).
Despite the dismal outlook, Becker and the USWA decided to win
at Ravenswood. They knew victory would take more than staffing
picket lines and waiting for the wheels of justice to tUrn at the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). It would not be enough to simply
fight back as they had done at USx. Both RAe's reorganization and
its bargaining strategy had revealed to the union that traditionalloy-
alties and commitments had been tossed aside. The Steelworkers could
not depend on RAC to play according to the old rules. The union tac-
tics would need to change as well.
The Steelworkers knew that Ravenswood would require moving be-
yond the corporate campaign strategy pioneered by Ray Rogers at J. P.
Stevens in the late 1970s, which focused primarily on pressuring cor-
porate boards. Despite high hopes for Rogers' corporate campaign
model, the Stevens' victory did not translate into a series of easy wins
for labor. In the years that followed, unions began experimenting with
a number of other tactics, including in-plant strategies, community
coalitions, and more rank-and file involvement. Yet, individually none
of these tactics proved to be labor's secret weapon. As the Steelworkers
began organizing their campaign for Ravenswood, the consensus was
emerging that all of these aspects would need to be involved in mov-
ing from a corporate to a more coordinated campaign model.
The Ravenswood campaign was built around several basic princi-
ples-extensive research, constant escalation of strategically targeted
tactics, and the involvement of rank-and-file workers in all aspects of
the campaign. The commitment to research was unprecedented. One
of the mysteries in Ravenswood was how Emmett Boyle, a former plant
engineer and manager who had left the plant when it was still owned
by Kaiser Aluminum, retUrned a few short years later as the new CEO
and a major shareholder of the now privately held company.
Boyle was hated by workers who watched him combine jobs, speed
up production, and let safety conditions deteriorate to the point at
which five workers had been killed in the short time he had owned the
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plant. Yet the Steelworkers did not make the mistake of earlier corpo-
rate campaigns by focusing exclusively on the obvious target. They un-
derstood that a strategic campaign needs to do more than just bring
pressure to bear. It must direct that pressure toward those who have
the power to settle.
The research conducted for the Steelworkers by the Industrial Union
Department of the AFL-CIO (IUD) discovered that Boyle was little
more than a front man for forces in the industry that existed far be-
yond company headquarters in West Virginia. Over the next six
months the Steelworkers and the IUD combed loan agreements and
Emmett Boyle's divorce papers and gleaned whatever information they
could from the unionized workforce. Everything pointed to Claren-
don Ltd., a subsidiary of Marc Rich A.G., indicating that financier
Marc Rich was ultimately in control of Ravenswood. Rich did not ac-
tually own Ravenswood but controlled it indirectly through a tangled
web of loans, raw materials, and tolling agreements through which he
bought and sold molten aluminum produced by others.
Rich was no ordinary metals trader. According to a former Citicorp
oil expert, whether plundering state-owned businesses, violating trade
sanctions, or making profitable metals trades with Chile's Augusto
Pinochet or Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, Rich and his partners "made
a business out of doing business other people would not do," often op-
erating in the shadows of the law (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999,
105). In 1983 the U.S. government issued a fifty-one-count indictment
against Rich and his colleagues, charging them with racketeering, mail
and wire fraud, tax evasion, and trading with the enemy, primarily for
their violation of the U.S. oil embargo with Iran. Rich, who had trans-
ferred the ownership of his trading company to the newly formed paper
corporation Clarendon, fled the United States, settling in Zug, Switzer-
land.
But the research did not stop with the connection to Rich. It con-
tinued throughout the campaign, identifYing an ever-increasing num-
ber of areas where pressure could be applied. The campaign targeted
beverage and can companies that purchased the finished aluminum
can stock from RAe. Local union members waited with their cars
gassed up to follow trucks maybe for a few hours or even a few days to
identifY where can stock was heading. They also developed a safety and
k, Becker and the USWA decided to win
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health campaign based on years of meticulous records kept by Local
5668 Health and Safety Director Bill Doyle and the horrendous acci-
dent and death rate in the plant.
The basic operating principle of the committee was escalation. As
.
Becker suggests,
The last thing that I wanted that company, Emmett Boyle [and
Marc Rich, and Willy Strothotte] to think of before he went to bed
at night, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday,
and Sunday night. . . is all the problems and difficulties we caused
them that day. And the first thing I wanted them to think of when
they woke up is, 'Oh, Christ, I've got to go oUt and face them sons
of bitches again. . . . ' We had to get them thinking aboUt the
Steelworkers continually, every day. . . if we let an hour go by that
our name didn't cross their minds for some reason or another, then
we were failing (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999,132).
By the spring of 1991 the escalation began to payoff. A number of
beverage companies, including Stroh's and Budweiser, stopped buying
RAC metal; the Occupational Safety & Health Administration
(OSHA) ordered an unprecedented wall-to-wall inspection of the
Ravenswood plant; and the NLRB issued a complaint against RAe.
Success like this would have some unions feeling smug abour their ac-
complishments. Yet, in an effort that distinguished their actions from
many early efforts at coordinated campaigns, Becker and the USWA
neither gave up nor slowed down the campaign. This was not a one-
dimensional strategy but a multifaceted campaign: as one strategy
cooled down, another would heat up.
The campaign soon developed far beyond the purview of most
union contract battles. During the summer of 1991, the USWA took
the campaign and the local union bargaining committee to Marc Rich's
backyard. The Steelworkers linked up with the Swiss Metal workers
union (SMUV), the International Chemical and Energy Workers
(ICEF), and the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF), and
began what would be a series of trips to Europe. Through their rese~r~h
they had discovered that Marc Rich's empire depended on his abllIty
to make deals in secret, and the last thing that Rich wanted was pub-
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ciple of the committee was escalation. As
licity. At this point Rich was beginning to move into Eastern Europe
and hardly wanted his fugitive status to be highlighted.
Over the next several months the Steelworkers would travel to
Switzerland, the Netherlands, England, France, and Romania and put
up what USWA Organizing Director Bernie Hostein would call "a
picket line around the world" (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999,169).
They met with bank officials who held loans on RAC and leafleted
Rich's colleagues and competitors at high-level metals trading confer-
ences with Marc Rich "Wanted" posters. They conducted street the-
ater with oversized street puppets of Mother Jones (an early West Vir-
ginia labor heroine) and Marc Rich himself
Local union members were actively involved in each of these trips
to Europe. Perhaps the most novel aspect of the Ravenswood campaign
was its linking of rank-and-file militancy and solidarity with the larger
strategic goals of the union. In this way it contrasts sharply with many
of the early corporate campaigns that tended to marginalize rank-and-
file workers while some small group of staff or consultants planned and
executed a high-level corporate strategy.
However important the larger union strategy, including the inter-
national campaign, the lockout could not have been sustained with-
out the courage and dedication of the locked-out workers and their
families. Most had worked in the plant since it first opened in the 1950S,
and many came from mineworker families or were former minework-
ers themselves. With an average age of 53, they were committed to their
union and to each other. Throughout the twenty-month lockout, only
seventeen of their seventeen hundred members crossed the line. Long
before the international union had gotten involved, the local had set
up a system to monitor plant activity by radio, boat, plane, and by
tracking trucks. The local union built an assistance center to distrib-
ute strike funds according to need, which turned into a full-fledged
food bank later in the lockout. Not a single worker went without food,
lost their house or car, or was unable to pay their children's tuition bills
for the duration of the lockout.
Early in the campaign the workers' wives had also set up a women's
support committee, just as their predecessors had in Flint, Michigan,
and Pittston Coal. While their locked-out husbands were enjoined
from doing little more than symbolic picketing, the women's support
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committee stepped in. In addition to providing Christmas gifts for the
children and food for union events, they snarled traffic in front of the
plant, painted antiscab and anti-Boyle graffiti on barns and hillsides,
and traveled across the country lobbying politicians and raising funds.
for their cause.
Local union officers and members were the core of the trips to Eu-
rope as well. The union realized that its best representatives were the
locked-out workers themselves, and they received tremendous atten-
tion across Europe. They not only made the strategy more effective bUt
also brought that strategy home to all the locked-out workers, their
families, and the broader Ravenswood community.
By the spring of 1992 the combination of the research, escalating
pressure tactics, and the continued solidarity and involvement of rank-
and-file members had tightened the screws on Rich and Ravenswood
Aluminum. OSHA had issued a several hundred-thousand-dollar fine,
an environmental campaign was gaining momentum, can manufac-
turers continued to drop RAC metal, and Rich was prevented from
making secret deals for a hotel in Romania and smelters in Czecho-
slovakia and Venezuela. Rich also lost his contract to supply copper to
the U.S. Mint. The Mint contract, with one of the nations' top ten
most-wanted white collar criminals, had prompted a congressional
committee to launch an in-depth investigation into Rich's operations.
International union actions were being planned by the USWA and
labor allies in Bulgaria, Russia, Australia, Finland, Spain, Hong Kong,
and Israel for May and June. The NLRB also would soon issue its de-
cision on whether RAC had illegally locked out its workers, making it
liable for millions of dollars in back pay plus interest.
By June a settlement was reached. Under the new agreement, the
scabs and subcontractors would be dismissed, the health and safety is-
sues would be addressed, and the cost of living adjustment would be
maintained. There would be a wage increase of $1.25 over the life of
the agreement and $2000 back pay for every worker. Most important,
everyone of the locked-out workers, except for two workers convicted(
of felonies, would return to the plant.
It was a tremendous victory not just for the Ravenswood workers
but also for their union and the entire labor movement. Through a
new model of comprehensive campaigns, the research, the escalating
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Bayou Steel: No Easy Replication
In the wake of the Ravenswood victory, the Steelworkers faced an
equally tough adversary at Bayou SteeP Bayou was one of the first
minimills the Steelworkers organized and brought under contract, and
it was extremely important to the union. But by 1993, as bargaining
for the union's second agreement broke down, all was in jeopardy. Not
unlike the sitUations at Phelps Dodge and Ravenswood, the USWA
was now facing a company controlled by an investor group. Under the
leadership of Howard Meyers, the group's primary goal was to re-
structUre Bayou in a manner that would enhance financial retUrns to
investors by expanding rolling capacity, refinancing the debt, and dra-
matically cutting labor costs.
The group's strategy was to force the union out on strike to either
bring their wages and benefits in line with their nonunion competi-
tors or break the union altogether. By the time the agreement expired
on March 20, 1993, the company was bargaining backward, replacing
wage gains with incentive pay, cUtting back on overtime and health-
care benefits, and demanding a unilateral right to contract out work
and layoff their workforce.
Learning from their slow start at RAC, the Steelworkers were anx-
ious to get a campaign quickly under way. Within months of the walk-
out, the union committed extensive staff and financial resources and
sent many of the same experts to Louisiana who had run and staffed
the Ravenswood campaign. In essence, they simply transferred the
Ravenswood strategy and machinery almost in its entirety to Bayou.
Once in place, the strategy team quickly hit Bayou on every front:
NLRB, OSHA, and environmental charges; truck-tracking and an end-
j
3All information on Bayou Steel is drawn from Seroka (1998) unless otherwise noted.
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users campaign; shareholder actions; political action; and trips to Eu-
rope. The Ravenswood Women's Support Committee even traveled
down to Louisiana to help the spouses of the striking Bayou workers
set up their own women's support committee, the Hearts of Steel.
Just as in Ravenswood, the Bayou local threw themselves into the
fight to save their union. As a newly organized unit in a fiercely right- '
to-work state, they were proud that 220 of the 300 workers in the bar-
gaining unit were members of the union. At first, nearly all no union
members and their families aggressively supported the strike. They were
comforted and exhilarated by the support provided by the international
union and the broader labor movement. Action by action, they watched
their strategy wreak havoc on the company. OSHA citations, Environ-
mental Protection Agency investigations, NLRB charges, the end-user
campaign, and shareholder and SEC actions were dearly costing the
company millions of dollars and seriously damaging their public image.
But each time the leverage appeared to be working and the union
and company appeared to be dose to settling the strike, Meyers re-
sponded in kind, pUtting something else on the table that he knew the
workers and the union couldn't accept. The union had found ways to
exert great pressUte on Meyers, to get him to think about the union
campaign "Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday. . . ," but they
still had not convinced him or the other Bayou investors that it was in
their interest to allow the union back in the plant. Although the
Ravenswood tactics were working on one level, they were failing to
exert the pressure that they had on RAC and Marc Rich.
As we have argued above, an integral part of the victory at
Ravenswood was the development of tactics and strategies that were
rooted in careful research and a serious understanding of how power
and decision making flowed in Ravenswood and its allied companies.
But Bayou was a different company, with a different ownership struc-
ture, workforce, and labor history than Ravenswood. Thus, the strate-
gies and tactics that the union so carefully honed at Ravenswood did
not have the same impact when transferred to Bayou Steel.
Unlike Ravenswood, where the union had been in place for nearly forty
years and where the workers lived in a homogeneous rural community
steeped in the mineworker traditions of union militancy and solidarity,
Bayou had only been under union contract since February 1986 and had
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ooly been in operation since 1981. 10 contrast to integrated steel or alu-
minum plants that need thousands of workers to produce their product,
minim ills such as Bayou are able to produce steel with many fewer work-
ers. The location of the plant in southern Louisiana, with its mix of races,
cultures, and union experience was also an important difference.
Meyers, too, had learned from the Ravenswood campaign. Rather
than calling the scabs permanent replacements and thereby permitting
the union to offer to return to work and transform the strike into a
lockout, the company never fired the strikers except for those they
charged with picket-line violence. Following a page out of the RAC
playbook, in August 1995 Bayou filed a RICO suit naming the inter-
national officers, IUD staff, and local officials as coconspirators. Al-
though the suit had no merit, it forced the union to devote extensive
staff and financial resources to defend themselves, distracting attention
and energy from the campaign itself.
The union continued to escalate the campaign but now moved more
cautiously as, in the aftermath of the RICO suit, the union legal staff
began to playa larger role. As the campaign dragged on, many of the
outside experts moved on to other union struggles, and the Steel-
workers began to rely more on their own staff The campaign began
slowly shifting beyond simply replicating the Ravenswood strategy to
targeting Bayou's specific vulnerabilities-the ability of Meyers' group
to refinance their debt, expand their rolling capacity, and sell stock.
By the fall of 1996, three and a half years into the strike, both sides
were exhausted by the continued struggle, but the union had won some
major battles. After months of pressure, that summer they forced the
company to recognize the union at their new facility in Tennessee and
they had made a highly successful trip to Europe where they reminded
Meyers that they would follow him everywhere he tried to make new
investments or expand his operations. Now, in September, the com-
pany faced the NLRB 'unfair labor practice trial and the potential for
extensive negative publicity and massive back-pay liability.
On September 23, 1996, as the unfair labor practice trial opened in
,
New Orleans, the company made a move toward a real settlement. By
the end of the day the NLRB case was withdrawn and the contract was
settled. The settlement was an important victory for the union after
forty-two months, the longest strike in Steelworker history. Still, the
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victory at Bayou was by no means complete. As Seroka explains, "The
incentive plan was still there. Members would be expected to con-
tribUte to future health care costs and the company was allowed to sub-
contract work, although with a very restricted list of positions" (Seroka
1998,132-133). But the hardest thing for the returning workers to swal-
low was that the scabs would not be laid off, and sixty-five striking
workers who had been discharged for picket-line activity, including
union president Ron Ferraro, would have to arbitrate their return to
work. The RICO suit was left standing and would not be settled until
a year after the strike was over.
The Steelworkers, through the will of the international union and
the solidarity of the rank and file, had held out at Bayou. BUt in a cer-
tain way they had forgotten the most important lesson of
Ravenswood-the need to build a campaign from the inside oUt. In
part, they were not able to do this at Bayou because when the cam-
paign started they had yet to build the in-house capacity to run a
Ravenswood-style campaign. They could replicate the Ravenswood
strategy but they could not assume the Ravenswood workforce or the
Ravenswood corporate vulnerabilities. To tailor the strategy to fit the
workers, their community, and their company the way the union had
at Ravenswood was much more difficult.
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By the end of the Bayou campaign the Steelworkers had dramatically in-
creased their familiarity with and capacity to conduct sophisticated con-
tract campaigns. Because so many Steelworker staff had been involved
in multiple capacities in several of these campaigns, they now had the
expertise to run the campaigns in-house. Many international staff rep-
resentatives and district directors who were initially suspicious of the new
strategies had gotten a taste of their effectiveness and had come on board.
President Becker also dramatically restructured districts, moving aside
some of those most resistant to the new models and new strategies.
Part of the increased capacity was not just to develop a single model
for coordinated campaigns but, as the Steelworkers had learned from
Bayou, to build campaigns that grew from a detailed understanding of
4All information on Bridgestone/Firesrone is draw!
(1998) unless otherwise noted.
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: of the Ashes
each company and each workforce, and the recognition of the differ-
ences in each campaign. After Ravenswood and Bayou, the USWA also
had to demonstrate that coordinated campaigns could be useful in set-
tings other than huge industrial plants or in all-out wars with em-
ployers. If they were going to be truly useful as a strategic model, then
coordinated campaigns would have to be applicable to collective bar-
gaining in a host of different settings.
In the summer of 1995, still in the thick of the struggle at Bayou,
the USWA took on an even more difficult challenge. The Steel-
workers were not even on the scene when forty-two hundred mem-
bers of the United Rubber Workers (URW) went out on strike against
Bridgestone/Firestone in July 1994.4 Although the 1991-94 master
agreement between the URW and Japanese-owned Bridgestone/Fire-
StOne was celebrated by the industrial relations community as a model
of labor-management partnership, by 1994 the company had joined
other tire makers in what they secretly called the "War of'94," a com-
prehensive effort to break pattern bargaining in the tire industry and
severely weaken the URW's power and influence.
Ten months later, in May 1995, faced with the harsh reality of hun-
dreds of "crossovers"-twenty-three hundred permanent replace-
ments-and a seemingly impotent national boycott, the URW called
an end to the strike and made an unconditional offer to retUrn to work
under the terms of the company's final offer. That offer included se-
vere wage and benefit cuts, twelve-hour days, seven-day workweeks,
mandatory work on holidays at reduced pay, and a two-tiered wage
scale. BridgestOne/Firestone responded by hiring back less than a quar-
ter of the workforce, who were then forced to work surrounded by
scabs, without benefit of a union contract.
Within months the URW merged with the United Steelworkers,
who, as part of the merger agreement, had promised to finance and
staff a full-blown comprehensive campaign to get all the striking work-
ers back to work at Bridgestone/Firestone under a union agreement. If
Ravenswood and Bayou seemed difficult, this appeared to be a virtu-
,
ally impossible task.
10S complete. As Seroka explains, "The
Members would be expected to con-
rs and the company was allowed to sub-
very restricted list of positions" (Seroka
rhing for the retUrning workers to swal-
not be laid off, and sixty-five striking
rged for picket-line activity, including
would have to arbitrate their return to
;tanding and would not be settled until
:he will of the international union and
Ie, had held out at Bayou. But in a cer-
en the most important lesson of
ld a campaign from the inside out. In
this at Bayou because when the cam-
build the in-house capacity to run a
[hey could replicate the Ravenswood
lme the Ravenswood workforce or the
bilities. To tailor the strategy to fit the
their company the way the union had
~ difficult.
~n the Steelworkers had dramatically in-
:lcapacity to conduct sophisticated con-
ny Steelworker staff had been involved
of these campaigns, they now had the
in-house. Many international staff rep-
who were initially suspicious of the new
~ireffectiveness and had come on board.
LIlyrestructured districts, moving aside
rhe new models and new strategies.
. was not just to develop a single model
, as the Steelworkers had learned from
grew from a detailed understanding of
4All information on Bridgestone/Firestone is drawn from Balfour et al. (2000) and Lessin
(1998) unless otherwise noted.
228 Kate Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich Strategic and Coordinated Bargaining C
The Bridgestone/Firestone strategy included targeting every plant
and headquarters facility in the United States and abroad, as well as
stockholders, major creditors, and international bodies such as the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Just as in
Ravenswood, as part of their international strategy the union sent
worker delegations to Japan to meet with labor, religious, and civil
rights organizations. But this time, instead of just sending local union
leaders and activists, the union decided to send along workers' fami-
lies, including spouses and children as young as two years old. As
USWA campaign coordinator Gerald Fernandez eXplained
I wanted to put a human face to the strike. I wanted the Japanese
to understand the suffering. I wanted the Japanese people and
workers and unions to understand that they had essentially fired
twenty-seven hundred people. . . . In these types of things you
can't send officials of the union or paid professionals to do that
kind of thing. You have to put a face to the struggle (Balfour et al.
2000,45).
anapolis 500. It was a breathtaking agenc
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o£ the combined internal and external ca
The USWA global campaign was not limited to Japan; delegations
of workers and their families traveled to more than a dozen countries
in fuia, Europe, and Latin America, and contacts were made in at least
seventy more. The international campaign culminated in the summer
of 1996, two years into the strike, in what the union called "Interna-
tional Days of Outrage." During a few short weeks, the USWA orga-
nized major demonstrations and job actions with their counterparts in
Japan, France, Turkey, Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina. The Days of
Outrage closed at the World Conference for the Bridgestone Corpo-
ration, organized by the Steelworkers just outside Bridgestone/Fire-
stone's lavish headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee, where George
Becker told the assembled crowd, "We intend to develop a global union
workers' action plan to counter this company's growing disregard for
its workers' interests, and its eXploitation of the economies of both
Third World and industrially developed nations" (Balfour et al. 2000,
71).
The union also brought pressure to bear on customers such as tire
dealerships, automakers, local and state governments who had con-
tracts with Bridgestone/Firestone, and racetracks such as the Indi-
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III decided to send along workers' fami-
:hildren as young as rwo years old. As
. Gerald Fernandez eXplained
anapolis 500. It was a breathtaking agenda that could have only been
undertaken with the experience of campaigns like Ravenswood and
Bayou and the capacity the union had built in the process.
As in Ravenswood and Bayou, the union also filed massive health
and safety, environmental, and NLRB charges. But, unlike in
Ravenswood, at Bridgestone/Firestone a thousand union members had
retUrned to work inside the struck plants, under conditions that some
described as a "living hell," and thousands of other USWA members
were working under extended contracts at Bridgestone/Firestone plants
that were not part of the strike. So in. addition to the external cam-
paign, the union launched a full-scale in-plant campaign, replete with
solidarity days, mass grievances, phone and fax jamming of corporate
offices, and escalating work-to-rule actions and slowdowns. The scope
of the combined internal and external campaign was staggering.
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I wanted the Japanese people and
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ut a face to the struggle (Balfour et al. [Three point six] million handbills, nearly a million 'Don't Buy
Bridgestone/Firestone' stickers and bumper stickers, 250,000 cam-
paign buttons, II5,000 small black flags, and 15,000 "Don't Buy"
T-shirts were distributed; 63,000 yard signs were displayed. Thou-
sands of separate campaign events involved over 60,000 USWA
participants and volunteers; 1,100 separate USWA locals were ac-
tively involved. Camp Justice (the USWA solidarity campsite) was
occupied for 246 days; the campaign reached 86 countries, includ-
ing 16 visited by replaced Bridgestone/Firestone [workers]; and 43
foreign workers visited the U.S. to lend their support (United
Steelworkers of America 1997, 14-15).
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By November 1996 Bridgestone/Firestone had had enough. The
union reached a tentative agreement, winning immediate reinstate-
ment for all union members, including all but four of those discharged
for strike-related misconduct, and major gains on almost every issue
that had prompted the strike except for twelve-hour shifts and the
elimination of paid hours for union health and safety work. Perhaps
most impressive of all, the new contract would expire simultaneously
.
with other master agreements in the industry. In the words of Uni-
versity of Akron professor and tire industry expert David Meyer, the
union's accomplishment was "drop-dead, jaw-to-the-floor amazing"
(Lessin 1998,68).
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As George Becker later would say, with Bridgestone/Firestone, on
the heels of Ravenswood and then Bayou, the Steelworkers had proven
to themselves, the labor movement, and corporate America, that they
"knew what it takes to win" (Becker 1998). Still, the union steadfastly
maintained that their goal was to do everything possible to reach an ,
agreement without engaging in these kinds of all-out struggles. As their
postcampaign report, "One Day Longer: The Road to Victory at
Bridgestone/Firestone," stated, "We much prefer. . . to resolve our dif-
ferences through negotiation. . . . BUt the real lesson here is that the
best way to avoid a fight is to be ready for one. Real victory comes when
you are too strong for your enemy to attack you. We must create situ-
ations in which companies recognize that they cannot destroy unions"
(United Steelworkers of America 1997, 16).
'All information on Wheeling Pitt is drawn from O'Malley (1998) unless otherwise noted.
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From Wheeling Pitt to NIPSCO: Expanding the
Scope of Strategic Campaigns
On October I, 1996, just as the Bridgestone/Firestone campaign was
coming to a head, another forty-four hundred Steelworkers went out
on strike against Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corporation at eight mills
scattered across the Ohio and Monongahela River valleys in West Vir-
ginia, Pennsylvania, and southern Ohio.5 The workers were striking to
win back the decent benefit pension plan that they had lost eleven years
before in the aftermath of concessions, bankruptcy, and a bitter 98-day
strike. In the ensuing years, the company had come under the control
of Ronald LaB ow, a Wall Street bankruptcy specialist, who by the time
of the strike had made Wheeling Pitt one of the most profitable com-
panies in the industry, netting him more than $80 million in a few
short years.
The Steelworkers went into bargaining in 1996 knowing that it
would take a full-scale comprehensive campaign to win a defined ben-
efit pension fund (a pension fund not tied to the ups and downs of the
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market) from LaBow. Until then almost all USWA campaigns had been
reactive in nature, most starting up months into the campaign. This
time, when bargaining at Wheeling Pitt broke off at midnight on Oc-
tober I with no agreement on the defined benefit plan, the union had
a campaign plan ready to go, put together by the International's Strate-
gic Projects department in conjunction with all eight of the Wheeling
Pitt local unions.
Just as in Ravenswood and Bridgestone/Firestone, the key to the
Wheeling Pitt strategy was a multifaceted approach that escalated pres-
sure on Wheeling Pitt, its parent company WHX, and WHX sub-
sidiaries across the country while keeping the striking workers at each
of the plants committed to the strike. Striking Wheeling Pitt workers
traveled the country picketing and handbilling outside company head-
quarters and WHX subsidiaries. Massive NLRB charges were filed,
while religious leaders and national politicians weighed in to push
LaBow back to the bargaining table.
Six months into the strike LaBow responded by shutting down four
WHX plants, three of which were on strike. According to USWA Strate-
gic Projects DirectOr Ron Bloom, rather than having the intended ef-
fect of breaking the strikers' resolve, the plant closings "backfired" on
the company, making them look "vindictive and nasty. . . they over-
played their hand" (O'Malley 1998,58). In response, the union escalated
the pressure, purchasing airtime on local radio and television stations
featuring the personal stories of striking Wheeling Pitt workers and
reaching out to each member ofWHX's board of directors. The AFL-
CIO weighed in as well: President Sweeney announced a "solidarity con-
ference," inviting every central labor council and AFL-CIO affiliate in
the three affected states to help "develop some new strategies to deal
with Wheeling Pittsburgh and its CEO" (O'Malley 1998, 61).
By May 1997 Wheeling Pitt's stock had dropped from $10 to $6 a
share, and the company reported quarterly net losses of more than $30
million. When LaBow still refused to budge, the union embarked on
a nationwide "streets and suites" campaign that targeted the top ten
institutional investors in WHX stock, including, among others, Mer-
rill Lynch, Barclays Bank, Dewey Square, American Express, and Mel-
lon Bank, and their CEOs. By June, LaBow was back at the table, for
the first time seriously talking about pensions, and on August I, 3°4
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days after the strike began, he finally capitulated and agreed to the
union's demand-a defined benefit pension plan in line with the in-
dustry standard.
It was a hard-won victory. It was not easy keeping four thousand
workers out on what was really a one-issue strike, yet during all 304
days not one Wheeling Pitt worker crossed the line. fu Ron Bloom ex-
plained, both the union and Ron LaBow had gambled, each day con-
vinced that the other side would break first. In the end, according to
Bloom, LaBow "anted up three hundred times and he lost three hun-
dred times and then he said okay" (O'Malley 1998,83).
That same summer of 1997, while the media and the public were
focused on national strikes at United Parcel Service and Wheeling Pitt,
the Steelworkers were gearing up for a very different contract battle at
NIPSCO, the Northern Indiana Public Service Company.6 Unlike
their union counterparts at Ravenswood, Wheeling Pitt, Bayou, and
Bridgestone/Firestone, the 3,562 service, maintenance, clerical, and
technical employees of NIPS CO worked at a public utility, not a major
industrial plant. Until 1988 their company had been a regional utility
providing electric and gas services to residents of Northern Indiana. In
1988 that changed when NIPSCO was transformed into what man-
agement called "an energy-based holding company" (Clark and Ham-
mer 1998, 8). By the time the union entered into bargaining in 1998,
their utility plant was one of forty-eight different NIPSCO subsidiaries
involved in everything from gas and electric services to rail freight, gas
storage, commercial lighting, land acquisition, and real estate develop-
ment. Under the new company structure, the ratepayers for the core gas
and electric subsidiaries became the "cash cow" to finance the more risky
capital ventures in real estate and land acquisition. If the ventures failed,
the utility ratepayers were left to cover the losses. If they succeeded, the
profits were put back into additional financial ventures or to line the
pockets of the company's new owners and shareholders. In just a few
years the new NIPSCO holding company had generated more than
$400 million in excess cash, and its shareholders celebrated a 79 per-
cent return on their initial investment (Clark and Hammer 1998, 10).
GAll information on NIPSCO is drawn from Clark and Hammer (1998) unless otherwise
noted.
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lenefit pension plan in line with the in-
11from Clark and Hammer (1998) unless otherwise
Labor relations had also changed. At the same time utility rates were
skyrocketing, staffing at the plant had been cut by more than 21 per-
cent since 1992. Management came tothe table in 1996 unbending on
wage and staffing issues at the same time they refused to continue the
longstanding practice of early negotiations and joint bargaining with
the clerical and physical plant locals. Convinced that management
could easily recruit a full complement of replacement workers and out-
last any membership commitment to a strike, the local unions, with
the advice of the International, decided to launch an alternative cam-
paign. The workers would stay on the job, working without a contract,
while the union would run a national comprehensive campaign against
NIPSCO, targeting customers and shareholders.
The themes of the campaign focused on NIPSCO as the evil em-
pire of Star Wars, with the union joining the customers as the "rebel
alliance" fighting for justice. Over and over, in mailings, flyers, meet-
ings, mass rallies, and an in-depth report entitled "Milking the Cash
Cow," the campaign focused on skyrocketing utility rates, cuts in staff
and service quality, the accumulation of excess cash by NIPSCO's own-
ers, and how the owners and shareholders were lining their pockets at
the expense of their customers and their workers.
Throughout, the campaign was defined in terms of corporate greed
versus community and class, which resonated easily with the primar-
ily working class NIPSCO customer base in northern Indiana. The
union sought to shine a spotlight on the owners and shareholders, their
greed and mismanagement, both at NIPSCO and other companies
they owned, including the CEO of Welsh Oil and the president of Put-
due University, both of whom were NIPS CO directors.
The union also pursued an inside campaign to hold workers together
despite constant harassment from management day in a,nd day out in
the plants. The company had played on divisions between the primarily
female clerical unit and the largely male physical plant unit, so the
union made a priority of breaking down those differences and bring-
ing the two groups together. To accomplish this, they brought in Robin
. Rich from the Steelworkers local at Bethlehem Steel. Rich had coor-
dinated USWA solidarity for the Bridgestone/Firestone workers.
By early October it became clear to management that their attempts
to undermine union solidarity had backfired and that the union was
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winning the war of public opinion with their customers. By mid-
month the company came back to the table with a new agreement, in-
cluding none of the eighty-five wage, benefit, and work rule conces-
sions that had been included in their final offer when bargaining broke
down four months earlier. The new agreement, which was easily rati-
fied by the members on October 23, included major gains in wages and
benefits, as well as a signing bonus.
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Over the past decade there has been a rapid evolution of Steelworker
coordinated and strategic campaigns. From the early campaigns at USX
and Ravenswood, the Steelworkers have grown tremendously in their
capacity to conduct successful campaigns as diverse as Bridgestone/Fire-
stone and NIPSCO.
This evolution has not, however, reflected steady progress in a sin-
gle direction, forging a unitary model for strategic campaigns. It has
not been the evolution of a single, more-developed species. Instead, it
might best be characterized by the evolutionary concept of generalized
adaptation by which a less-specialized organism can survive in many
different environments, in part because it is neither as vulnerable nor
as inflexible as a more highly developed form.
Perhaps the most important observation that comes from this re-
view of a half dozen Steelworker collective-bargaining campaigns is
their diversity. After the Ravenswood victory, the USWA seemed as-
sured that they had discovered the best model for strategic campaigns.
Yet, as the near loss at Bayou showed, no single model was equallyef-
fective for every struggle. The Steelworkers learned, or relearned, from
their experience at Ravenswood that the campaign had to follow the
employer, the workforce, and the circumstances, not the other way
around.
This shift marks a true evolution from the early use of corporate
campaigns in the late 1970S and early 19805. Although the coordinated
campaign may not be the magic bullet that some believed, the Steel-
workers' experience demonstrates the continued relevance and effec-
tiveness of these campaigns, even against rapidly evolving employers
and Tom Juravich
c opinion with their customers. By
rnid-
back to the table with a new agreement,
in-
-five wage, benefit, and work rule conces-
d in their final offer when bargaining broke
The new agreement, which was easily rati-
tober 23, included major gains in wages and
~ bonus.
has been a rapid evolUtion of Steelworker
npaigns. From the early campaigns at USX
yorkers have grown tremendously in their
II campaigns as diverse as Bridgestone/Fire-
lowever, reflected steady progress in a sin-
ary model for strategic campaigns. It has
jingle, more-developed species. Instead, it
JYthe evolUtionary concept of generalized
;pecialized organism can survive in many
art because it is neither as vulnerable nor
T developed form.
lnt observation that comes from this re-
arker collective-bargaining campaigns, is
'enswood victory, the USWA seemed as-
:d the best model for strategic campaigns.
showed, no single model was equally ef-
~Steelworkers learned, or relearned, from
}od that the campaign had to follow the
d the circumstances, not the other way
'olUtion from the early use of corporate
1d early 1980s. Although the coordinated
19ic bullet that some believed, the Steel-
rates the continued relevance and effec-
even against rapidly evolving employers
Strategic and Coordinated Bargaining Campaigns in the 19905 235
in a complex global economy. These were not simply lucky victories
over weak employers. Facing the likes of Rich, Meyers, LaB ow, and
Bridgestone/Firestone CEO Yoichiro Kaizaki, the Steelworkers were
up against some of the most powerful and ruthless individuals and or-
ganizations in the world. These victories have proven to both unions
and employers that in today's economy in which corporate structures
focus less on direct corporate ownership and more on a widening
sphere of control, these new structures are not impenetrable to work-
ers and their unions.
The USWA also did not win in only one type of setting; they won
against large and small employers, with senior, stable workforces and
new ones, and in industrial and service industries. Although we have
not provided enough data points for a quantitative analysis, these six
case studies strongly indicate the applicability of this overall model or
approach across different kinds of employers, workplaces, and com-
munmes.
Continuing to refer to the Steelworkers' approach as a "model" for
comprehensive campaigns may even be a misnomer. One of the major
factors behind the continued success of the Steelworkers' campaigns
was that they were not comprised of a series of tactics appended onto
an existing union structure. Part of the maturation of the post-
Ravenswood USWA was the realization that these coordinated cam-
paigns were the building blocks and the very fiber of the union. Al-
though the union strongly embraced the struggle at Ravenswood in an
emotional and ideological sense, some years passed before they had ac-
tually gone through sufficient organizational change necessary to reg-
ularly engage in this level of campaign.
By the time of the Bridgestone/Firestone campaign, a struggle that
few other unions would have had the courage to even try, the USWA
had the institutional structure in place to make running and winning
the campaign possible. By then it was no longer just George Becker and
a few Steelworkers' staff trying to convince the rest of the union about
the efficacy of this approach. The union now had the organizational
. commitment and machinery to make the campaign possible without
the Herculean start-up costs and delays that had made Ravenswood so
challenging. Although the union did learn important lessons about the
nUts and bolts of these campaigns along the way, the real evolUtion was
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not in the technical aspects of coordinated campaigns but in the orga-
nizational and cultural change of the Steelworkers.
The changes were also not just organizational changes at the top.
Part of the effectiveness of these changes was that they reverberated
throughout the organization, into local unions and into the hearts and
minds of local union members. Rather than moving away from the
commitment, energy, and militancy of local union members, the co-
ordinated campaign approach embraced their interests and depended
on their active participation in building one union rather than layers
of interest groups. A5 much as anything, these changes were about a
return to basic values in the USWA and the courage to stand up for
justice and dignity for rank-and-file workers.
Each of these victories went far beyond the industrial enterprise.
The Steelworkers did not just save thousands of union jobs through
their efforts, they changed the balance of power in collective bargain-
ing across the steel, rubber, and aluminum industries. As the Steel-
workers have reported in the aftermath of these hard-won victories,
many employers came to the table ready to reach a fair agreement with-
out going to war with the USWA.
A5 we found in our research, the union still has room to stumble
along the way. The international union staff and officers coordinating
the campaigns too easily start to think that their skills, experience, and
ingenuity can supplant the need for full-membership involvement and
participation in the campaign. They forget that the participation of the
members, their voices, their stories, and their commitment is what in-
spires and generates support from other workers and allies around the
globe. They also forget that no campaign strategy is worth anything if
the members cross the line. Most of all, in the desire to win and win
quickly, sometimes they forget the real issues that generated the strug-
gles in the first place, and the true costs of some of the concessions nec-
essary to get an agreement.
Despite these concerns, the Steelworkers' success provides tremen-
dous hope for an American labor movement looking to rebuild and re-
shape itself After enduring a decade of concessions in industries going
through free fall, the Steelworkers have reestablished themselves as a
force to be reckoned with at the bargaining table. Although they may
have overreached in their initial efforts during which they courageously
lunged at their opponents, clearly they t
tionally to make these victories routine. SiJ
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lunged at their opponents, clearly they have now matured organiza-
tionally to make these victories routine. Since NIPSCO they have gone
on to win at Newport News, Continental Tire, and MSI, with similar
campaigns under way at CFI, Titan Tire, and Kaiser.
There is much that can be learned from these campaigns, not just
as it applies to the Steelworkers but to the entire American labor move-
ment. As George Becker suggested in the aftermath of the Ravenswood
victory:
Struggles such as this renew the labor movement. The Ravens-
wood campaign demonstrated what it takes to win even where
the employer is determined to bust the Union-perseverance,
constant escalation of the battle, and a dogged determination not
to quit no matter how bleak the circumstances may look. The
labor movement must be constructive, creative, and ever willing
to change but it must never, never forget how to fight (Juravich
and Bronfenbrenner 1999, 216).
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